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Abstract
Background: Ongoing conflict and systematic targeting of health facilities and personnel by the Syrian regime in 
opposition-controlled areas have contributed to health system and governance mechanisms collapse. Health directorates 
(HDs) were established in opposition-held areas in 2014 by the interim (opposition) Ministry of Health (MoH), to 
meet emerging needs. As the local health authorities responsible for health system governance in opposition-controlled 
areas in Syria, they face many challenges. This study explores ongoing health system governance efforts in 5 opposition-
controlled areas in Syria. 
Methods: A qualitative study design was selected, using in-depth key informant interviews with 20 participants 
purposely sampled from HDs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), donors, and service-users. Data were analysed 
thematically. 
Results: Health system governance elements (ie, strategic vision, participation, transparency, responsiveness, equity, 
effectiveness, accountability, information) were considered important, but not interpreted or addressed equally in 
opposition-controlled areas. Participants identified HDs as primarily responsible for health system governance in 
opposition-controlled areas. Main health system governance challenges identified were security (eg, targeting of health 
facilities and personnel), funding, and capacity. Suggested solutions included supporting HDs, addressing health-worker 
loss, and improving coordination. 
Conclusion: Rebuilding health system governance in opposition-controlled areas in Syria is already progressing, despite 
ongoing conflict. Local health authorities need support to overcome identified challenges and build sustainable health 
system governance mechanisms.
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Implications for policy makers
• Political recognition of local health authorities is necessary if initial grassroots governance initiatives are to succeed.
• Financial and technical support of local health authorities is urgently needed if they are to survive.
• To protect fragile health system governance initiatives, the international community must do more to end bombings of health facilities and 
health-workers in opposition-controlled areas.
Implications for the public
This qualitative study is a first effort to explore health system governance in opposition-controlled areas in Syria. found that despite tremendous 
challenges, including ongoing conflict and targeted bombings, local health directorates (HDs) in opposition-controlled areas are continuing to 
provide health services and developing fragile health system governance initiatives. Rebuilding of health system governance has already started, 
through local initiatives in opposition-controlled areas in Syria, but these HDs require additional technical and financial support to ensure that 
progress is not lost.
Key Messages 
Background
Syria, a lower-middle-income country in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, had a population of nearly 21 million in 
2010.1 The uprising started in 2011, after the arrest and 
torture of 15 boys in Dara’a who sprayed school walls with 
anti-government slogans.1 Initially non-violent protests soon 
spread, the Syrian regime responded by arresting and killing 
protesters,2-5 civilians began arming themselves,6 and non-
violent resistance became armed conflict.7 As opposition 
forces took control of many areas, the regime began bombing 
people and infrastructure.8,9
Authors selected the term ‘opposition-controlled areas’ to 
refer to areas of Syria controlled militarily by civil and former 
Syrian army groups (eg, Free Syria Army) in active conflict 
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with the Syrian regime, but not those areas controlled by 
Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) or foreign forces, eg, 
‘Islamic State.’
After conflict onset, the health system in opposition-
controlled areas largely collapsed as the 2 most important 
health governance actors – the state and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) – no longer operated there.10 Health 
professionals and facilities in opposition-controlled areas 
appear to have been systematically targeted by the regime 
and its allies.11 As of September 2018, 452 health facilities had 
been attacked and 886 health-workers killed, at least 90% by 
Syrian and Russian forces in opposition-controlled areas.12 
Attacks caused facilities to reduce services or close.13 Many 
health-workers fled, further reducing numbers in opposition-
controlled areas. For example, pre-revolution Aleppo had 
approximately one doctor per 800 people, while opposition-
controlled eastern Aleppo had approximately 1 per 7000 in 
2015.13 However, while deliberate attacks make headlines, 
the health system has been severely damaged in less obvious 
but potentially more devastating ways. Sometimes referred 
to as ‘the weaponisation of health,’ these include government 
ceasing to fund the health system in opposition-controlled 
areas and forbidding humanitarian aid or actors from working 
in these areas, collateral destruction, and mass displacement 
(including of health-workers).14 The loss of state and WHO 
support and restricted activities of traditional humanitarian 
actors in opposition-controlled areas contributed to a power 
vacuum that has been filled by a variety of existing health 
system and grassroots actors.
The conflict has both ‘weaponised’ and politicised health. 
Health systems are a natural arena of contestation during civil 
conflict, both as a means of punishing rebelling population 
groups (eg, through withdrawal or destruction of services) 
and as a potential source of legitimacy for opposition actors 
(eg, if they can provide decent health services they can 
improve perceived competence, caring, and thus legitimacy). 
However, health services provision in opposition-controlled 
areas is challenging, often lacking specialist staff, necessary 
equipment, and follow-up care.13,15-17 Acute and chronic 
illnesses have increased and many patients die from treatable 
conditions.18-20 Shortages and substandard medical equipment 
and supplies are worsened by insufficient electricity, water, 
and generator fuel.13,18,21 Professionals often stay 24/7 in health 
facilities to respond to emergencies, causing high stress and 
burnout.13,22,23 Financial incentives have largely disappeared as 
salaries are low and irregular.13 Limitations are partly overcome 
by referring some cases to neighbouring countries.24 However, 
this option is not available in all opposition-controlled areas 
as some are besieged or lack safe international access.25,26 
These challenges are not unusual, as civilian healthcare 
provision during active conflict is often constrained. For 
example, health professionals in Yemen also risk their lives to 
provide care, within a health system that has almost collapsed, 
and must focus on emergency provision while managing 
consequences of health-workers’ migration, shortages, 
and targeting of facilities and personnel.27,28 However, the 
scale of health system attacks remains greater in Syria, 
with approximately 485 facility attacks in Syria since 2014 
compared to approximately 160 in Yemen since 2015.12,29,30 
Seeking healthcare across borders was observed in chronic 
conflicts, including Palestine and Somalia.31 No data were 
found on the emergence of the private sector in opposition-
controlled Syria, as has been reported in other conflict-
affected countries.31
Overall, opposition-controlled areas in Syria are not as 
disorganised as might be expected.32 Existing elements of civil 
governance include police forces, judiciary structure, and 
technical directorates, eg, health and education.33 These local 
authorities were mainly formed to meet emerging community 
management needs, and their quantity, quality, activities, and 
composition varies.34 However, the minimal literature on 
governance in opposition-controlled areas in Syria does not 
describe health system governance.32-36
Health services were provided by Health Directorates 
(HDs) and non-govermental  organisations (NGOs).31,37 
International non-governmental organizations and local non-
governmental organizations began operating in opposition-
controlled areas in late 2012, bringing international 
funding.21,38 Most NGOs provided emergency humanitarian 
assistance, though some gradually started development 
and resilience programmes. As no unified formal authority 
existed in these areas, NGOs often worked without formal 
oversight or contractual agreements/memorandum of 
understanding with regime or opposition authorities.33,39 HDs 
in opposition-controlled areas were established in 2014 by the 
interim Ministry of Health (MoH) affiliated with the National 
Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces.40 
Similar structures existed before the conflict, and in regime-
controlled areas, but had collapsed in opposition-controlled 
areas. HDs in opposition-controlled areas aim to replicate 
the role of their predecessors, in providing provincial health 
system governance in affiliation with the interim MoH. 
HDs are the local authorities responsible for health system 
governance. However, while HDs were intended to be 
governance-oriented entities, most have naturally focused 
on service delivery during the crisis. As essential service 
providers, HDs face many challenges, including lack of 
expertise and managerial structures, as most leaders have not 
held similar positions before, and insufficient financing for 
required services and salaries.34 Daily shelling by the Syrian 
regime on opposition-held areas has increased instability 
and personnel loss, making daily life and administration 
difficult.34 
Good governance is credited with preventing conflict, 
reducing poverty, and promoting development. Governance is 
defined by the UK Department for International Development 
as “how institutions, rules and systems of the state-executive, 
legislature, judiciary, and military operate at a central and 
local level, and how the state relates to individual citizens, civil 
society and the private sector.”41 Health system governance can 
be defined as “the actions and means adopted by a society to 
organize itself in the promotion and protection of the health 
of its population.”42,43 While researchers recently developed 
this concept further, global research on health systems 
governance is still relatively limited.44-49 However, research 
indicates that strengthening health system governance in 
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conflict-affected countries can improve resilience and post-
conflict rebuilding.50-52 
For the international community to better support future 
governance initiatives in Syria, existing governance structures 
and perspectives on how health system governance is being 
enacted in opposition-controlled areas require examination. 
Thus, this study aimed to explore health system governance 
elements, challenges, and potential solutions in opposition-
controlled areas in Syria in 2016, to increase understanding 
of the contextual and historical factors of local governance 
engagement in Syria35 and contribute to the global debate on 
health system governance efforts in areas of ongoing conflict. 
Objectives were to examine local healthcare provider and 
service-user perceptions of: (i) health system governance 
elements drawn from Siddiqi and colleagues’ framework43; 
(ii) roles and relationships of institutional actors, and (iii) 
challenges and potential solutions. Recommendations for 
policy-makers and practitioners working on health system 
governance in similar settings are discussed. 
Methods
Study Design and Sampling
Due to the exploratory nature of research, a qualitative study 
design was chosen, using semi-structured key informant 
interviews with health service providers and service-users in 
selected catchments.53 The primary research questions was: 
“What lessons can be learnt from health system governance 
initiatives in opposition-controlled areas in Syria that might be 
applied to other conflicts?” The secondary research question 
was: “How have local health system actors filled the governance 
vacuum in opposition-controlled areas of Syria during the 
conflict, what sorts of health system governance structures exist, 
and should they be supported?”
Interview topic guide development and initial analysis were 
guided by Siddiqi and colleagues’ framework for assessing 
health system governance in low- and middle-income 
countries.43 Chosen for being relatively straightforward and 
previously applied in Eastern Mediterranean countries, it 
includes ten elements: (i) strategic vision, (ii) participation 
and consensus orientation, (iii) rule of law, (iv) transparency, 
(v) responsiveness, (vi) equity and inclusiveness, (vii) 
effectiveness and efficiency, (viii) accountability, (ix) 
intelligence and information, and (x) ethics.43 Table 1 in 
Results section provides a description of each element. 
Participants were purposively sampled to provide a range 
of health system contributions, categorised as: (i) HD, 
(ii) humanitarian NGO, (iii) donor, or (iv) service-user. 
Recruitment, particularly of HDs, local NGOs and service-
users, was challenged by confidentiality and safety concerns, 
limited electricity/internet access, and time constraints. 
Personal contacts were thus snowballed using WhatsApp, 
with each recommending 3 other potential participants, to 
increase trust and willingness to participate. International 
NGO and donor participants were recruited through website 
searches, email invitations, and personal contacts within 
organisations that had supported health services provision 
in Syria since at least 2013. NGO and donor participants 
were sampled nationally, as they normally worked in several 
provinces. Donors were defined as organisations supporting 
local authorities, either technically or financially. This 
approach appeared to provide sufficient diversity given 
ongoing constraints. 
HDs were chosen as local authorities based on expert 
opinion, with more experienced HD managers (ie, at least 1 
year) selected to participate. HD and service-user participants 
were sampled from 5 opposition-controlled provinces (ie, 
Aleppo, Dara’a, Hama, Idleb, Rural Damascus). These were 
chosen, with expert consultation, as the main opposition-
controlled areas with tangible forms of governance 
(Figure). HDs were not homogeneous, with different dates 
of establishment, sizes, resources, and security levels. For 
example, some HDs were already 4-5 years old at the time of 
this study (eg, Idleb), while others were only established the 
prior year by interim MoH decree (eg, Aleppo). Several HDs 
had some resources (eg, Idleb), while others had extremely 
limited funding (eg, Hama). Geographic size and population 
differed (eg, Idleb HD operated throughout the province, while 
Hama HD covered less than quarter of the province). Security 
levels differed in each province, which affected health needs 
and resources. For example, Rural Damascus HD operated 
in a besieged area, under constant bombardment and with 
limited resources, while Dara’a HD covered a relatively stable 
area and could obtain supplies from Jordan. 
Data Collection
Two topic guides (ie, providers, service-users) were developed 
to examine framework elements, governance roles and 
responsibilities, and perceived challenges/solutions based 
on the literature and expert consultation, while allowing 
exploration of emerging concepts.43 Interviews were 
deliberately structured to allow participants to provide their 
own understanding of governance elements. Thus, rule-of-law 
and ethics were excluded after initial question guide testing 
indicated that they were particularly problematic concepts for 
participants to consider during conflict. Provider interviews 
(ie, HD managers, NGO staff, donor representatives) used the 
full topic guide and lasted approximately one hour. Service-
user interviews, using a shortened topic guide (ie, fewer 
questions per element and excluding strategic vision and 
intelligence/information), lasted approximately 30 minutes. As 
participants were based in Syria or Turkey, and authors in the 
United Kingdom, all were conducted using Skype, WhatsApp, 
or telephone.54
Twenty interviews were conducted, 5 per participant 
category, in July-August 2016 (Table 2). Data saturation was 
determined using a saturation grid as described by Fusch 
and Ness.55 Interviews were conducted at times chosen by 
participants, digitally recorded and transcribed in Arabic 
(except one in English) and translated into English. Written 
and verbal informed consent were recorded before interviews. 
Participants were sent electronic copies of information sheet 
and consent form, with questions answered before interviews. 
Participants without computer access used mobile phones 
to photograph and send signed consent forms. This worked 
well as smart phones are readily accessible in Syria. Given 
security concerns, interviews were recorded anonymously 
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using numerical identification. Recordings and transcripts 
were stored in password-protected files.
Analysis
Data were analysed thematically by YD using deductive and 
inductive manual coding, according to the 6 phases described 
by Braun and Clarke.56 Data were initially deductively 
coded under the ten framework elements43 and perceived 
health system governance: (i) responsibilities, (ii) roles, (iii) 
challenges, and (iv) solutions. Sub-themes were developed 
inductively as described in Jones et al.57 Themes were reviewed 
by NH and discrepancies agreed between authors. Reporting 
adheres to COREQ (COnsolidated criteria for REporting 
Qualitative research).58 
Results
Results are organised under health system governance 
elements and 3 additional themes: (i) perceived health system 
governance responsibility and roles, (ii) perceived health 
system governance challenges, and (iii) suggested solutions. 
Participant responses were integrated where responses were 
alike and differentiated by participant type when this provided 
additional nuance. 
Health System Governance Elements
Table 1 provides participant perspectives related to each 
governance element. Although participants were not 
specifically asked about rule of law and ethics, relevant data 
emerging from interviews were included. 
Strategic vision was described differently, depending on 
participants’ role and interpretation, but was by necessity short 
to medium-term and primarily related to strategic planning. 
For example, HDs were described as necessarily reactive, 
trying to maintain immediate service provision despite 
constraints to longer-term vision due to both physical and 
funding insecurities. However, some participants described 
longer-term visions of HDs rebuilding and governing the 
Syrian health system. HD strategic plans ranged from 6 
months to 3 years. 
“We have a strategic plan for 3 years, divided into 3 
Table 1. Health System Governance Elements and Key Findings
Governance 
Elements Description Implementation Level Findings
Strategic vision
•	 Leaders have a broad long-term perspective on health 
and human development, a sense of strategic directions 
for such development, and understanding of historical, 
cultural and social complexities.
•	 Long-term vision was limited, but concerned with rebuilding the 
health system while short-term vision focused on maintaining a 
semblance of service provision.
•	 Strategic plans ranged from 6 months to 3 years.
Participation 
and consensus 
orientation
•	 All men and women have a voice in decision-making, 
either directly or through legitimate intermediaries 
representing their interests.
•	 Opinions of service-users were sometimes considered, but not 
routinely.
•	 HDs served as ‘intermediaries’ representing service-user 
interests.
Rule of law
•	 Legal frameworks pertaining to health should be fair and 
enforced impartially, particularly laws on human rights 
related to health.
•	 The absence of judiciary, executive, and legislative authorities in 
opposition-controlled areas severely limited rule of law.
Transparency 
•	 Free flow of information for all health matters, with 
processes, institutions and information directly accessible 
and sufficiently informative for those concerned.
•	 Information was shared internally (eg, within HD departments) 
and sometimes with external institutional bodies, but little was 
shared with the public.
Responsiveness
•	 Institutions and processes should try to serve all 
stakeholders, to ensure that policies and programs are 
responsive to service-user needs.
•	 The health system was perceived by service-users as responsive 
to people’s needs given the constraints of ongoing conflict.
Equity and 
Inclusiveness
•	 All men and women should have opportunities to improve 
or maintain their health and wellbeing.
•	 Health services were described positively by service-users as 
available to everyone for free. 
•	 No data were available on potential constraints for marginalised 
social groups. 
Effectiveness and 
efficiency 
•	 Processes and institutions should produce results that 
meet population needs and influence health outcomes 
while making the best use of resources.
•	 Quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of services were noted by 
service-users as acceptable given the severe constraints posed 
by ongoing conflict. 
Accountability 
•	 Decision-makers in government, the private sector, 
and civil society organizations involved in health are 
accountable to the public and institutional stakeholders.
•	 Internal and external monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms existed, eg, ‘beneficiary feedback mechanisms.’
•	 These were generally noted as insufficient, but improvements 
were limited by lack of funding and security. 
Information and 
intelligence 
•	 Intelligence and information are essential to provide 
evidence for informed decisions that support, or do not 
conflict with, the strategic vision for health.
•	 Minimal data were provided on types of information collected.
•	 Data collection methods varied, depending on funding, between 
using specialized teams to collect information directly or 
depending on other bodies to collect information.
Ethics
•	 Public health ethics include nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
dignity, justice, and respect for autonomy, which are 
important to safeguard service-user interests and rights.
•	 Ethical considerations were not explored, as this appeared too 
challenging for participants to address effectively given the 
ongoing conflict.
Abbreviation: HDs, Health directorates.
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smaller plans for each year, and we have indicators to 
measure our achievements at the end of each year that will 
help us to reach our goal of rebuilding the health system. We 
want to rebuild the health system according to international 
standards, taking our war context into account” (HD5).
NGO participants did not describe an explicit strategic 
vision, instead discussing intentions to continue service 
provision and support HDs, though some referred to 
institutional strategies for regional coordination, developing 
service provision guidelines, and working with Syrian 
refugees. NGO strategic plans thus ranged from non-existent 
to 3 years. Donor participants described their strategic vision 
as supporting local governance, either as specific HD support 
or generally supporting the transition from relief to recovery 
and health system rebuilding, backed by strategic plans 
ranging from 1 to 3 years.
Accounts differed on the degree of health system 
participation and consensus, and whether service-user 
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Table 2. Participant Information
Code Categoryb Location Interview Governance Elements and Themes Discussed
HD1 Health directorate Idleb, Syria WhatsApp
Accountability, strategic vision, transparency, intelligence and information 
management, legitimacy
Roles and relationships of institutional actors
Health governance challenges and solutions
HD2 Health directorate Hama, Syria WhatsApp
HD3 Health directorate Dara’a, Syria WhatsApp
HD4 Health directorate Rural Damascus, Syria Skype
HD5 Health directorate Aleppo, Syria Skype
SU1 Service-user Aleppo, Syria Skype
Transparency, legitimacy, effectiveness, responsiveness, inclusiveness, 
participation
SU2 Service-user Idleb, Syria WhatsApp 
SU3 Service-user Dara’a, Syria WhatsApp 
SU4 Service-user Rural Damascus, Syria WhatsApp 
SU5 Service-user Hama, Syria WhatsApp 
NG1a LNGO (active regionally since 2011) External Skype
Accountability, strategic vision, transparency, intelligence and information 
management
Roles and relationships of institutional actors
Health governance challenges and solutions
NG2a INGO (active regionally since 2013) External Skype
NG3a INGO (active regionally since 2013) External Skype
NG4a INGO (active regionally since 2013) External Skype
NG5a INGO (active regionally since 2012) External Skype
DO1 Donor External WhatsApp 
Accountability, strategic vision, transparency, intelligence and information 
management
Roles and relationships of institutional actors
Health governance challenges and solutions
DO2 Donor External WhatsApp 
DO3 Donor External Skype
DO4 Donor External Skype
DO5 Donor External Phone
Abbreviations: LNGO, Local Non-Governmental Organization; INGO, International Non-Governmental Organization. 
a  Years in brackets indicate when local and international non-governmental organisations began actively supporting health services provision in Syria; b Interview 
participants were predominantly Syrian rather than foreign staff, as they were expected to be more familiar with realities in Syria.
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opinions were considered in planning and implementation of 
services. Most participants indicated that the constraints of 
working within a conflict-affected area limited opportunities 
for service-user participation, leaving HDs to act as 
intermediaries to represent service-user interests. 
Given the severe constraints in which facilities 
operated, participants did not clearly distinguish between 
responsiveness and effectiveness. All participants indicated 
that HDs responded to service-users’ needs as much as 
possible, highlighting that this was not perfect, but good 
enough considering the situation. Similarly, opinions on 
effectiveness ranged from “bad” to “excellent.” However, 
participants generally agreed that quality was acceptable 
considering existing challenges. 
“The quality of services is bad. There is an absence of 
basic [resources] in field hospitals… However, considering 
the support they [hospitals] receive, I would say it [service 
quality] is excellent” (SU3).
Equity and inclusiveness were described minimally but 
positively, particularly the fact that services were free and 
available for everyone. However, participants provided no 
indication of concerns potentially compounded by conflict, 
eg, among already socially marginalised groups. Participants 
appeared familiar with transparency issues. HD participants 
reported that HD governance and service provision data 
were accessible by all staff, shared with at least one other 
institutional actor (eg, provincial councils, NGOs, interim 
MoH, hospital managers), and sometimes with the public. 
NGOs indicated that they provided public information about 
service availability, with some providing more comprehensive 
data, eg, budget, resource allocation, procurement plans, 
and distribution of beneficiaries. Donors indicated that 
their websites included data on organisational structure, 
available and expected funds, decision-making processes, and 
distribution of funded projects. Some donors additionally 
shared information with other actors, including HDs, local 
councils, and vendors. Service-users indicated some level of 
health system transparency and information access, though 
details were vague despite probing. 
Participants described accountability in terms of internal 
or external scrutiny and related consequences. HDs were 
described as having internal and external accountability 
mechanisms, eg, audits. Some HD participants described 
electing their HD director as a demonstration of accountability, 
which they noted as unusual, as before the revolution all staff 
including directors were appointed. While participants noted 
existing accountability mechanisms as unsatisfactory, they 
indicated that significant improvements were not feasible 
given the lack of security and funding.
“We have a monitoring and evaluation department in the 
health directorate [HD] that monitors all projects and ensure 
that we stick to laws and regulations and international 
standards […]. We are open for external monitoring and 
have had external actors monitoring and evaluating our 
projects in the past, such as one of the NGOs, or donors, or 
provincial council” (HD5).
NGO and donor participants described having 
‘beneficiary feedback mechanisms’ and internal and external 
accountability mechanisms, while NGOs additionally 
mentioned accountability to donors. 
Participants described legitimacy as a related concept, 
in terms of the acceptability and credibility of institutions 
and their perceived ‘right to govern’ by stakeholders. HDs 
appeared to gain legitimacy primarily from local actors 
(eg, health facility managers, local and provincial councils, 
doctors, communities), though certain external actors (eg, 
NGOs, donors) could also impart some legitimacy. 
“HD legitimacy exists and continues to exist by agreement 
of doctors working inside Syria mainly and secondly by 
working and coordinating with NGOs” (HD2).
Information management appeared to be a significant 
issue for all actors. Data were collected, but not necessarily 
in the most efficient manner, nor could they necessarily be 
acted upon to support strategy. HDs collected data either by 
specialist teams or by email from facility managers. NGOs 
collected data directly from health facilities or from other 
NGOs, while donors collected data through regular reports 
from those they funded along with some in-house monitoring 
and evaluation. 
“We gather information from hospitals by email every month. 
However, every hospital uses their own form to collect data 
and this affects the accuracy of [feasibility of consolidating] 
information gathered” (HD1).
Health System Governance Responsibility and Roles
Participants were asked to identify the main institutional 
actor responsible for health system governance in opposition-
controlled areas and describe the roles of relevant actors 
in health system governance. Most agreed that HDs were 
responsible for health system governance in opposition-
controlled areas, though some HD participants suggested this 
should shift in future to the interim MoH. However, a few 
suggested that NGOs were primarily or jointly responsible, 
since NGOs had the money and provided services. Some 
NGO participants additionally noted that other local 
authorities competed for this responsibility in some provinces. 
Donor participants indicated that several stakeholders were 
responsible for health system governance, including NGOs, 
HDs, WHO, and other local actors, but that HDs should be 
the main responsible actors. Service-user participants said 
HDs or NGOs were responsible, but suggested HDs should 
be the responsible body. Responses indicated the fragmented 
and contested nature of the health system in these provinces 
as well as pragmatic acceptance that HDs were filling this role 
as best they could in a challenging environment. 
“There is no one body responsible in Syria now… There 
is a need for [the interim] MoH and NGOs to share 
responsibilities for health governance, [as] the concept of 
governance is new in Syria… I think the current situation 
is normal, but maybe not healthy […] In the future, the 
strategic work should be the responsibility of MoH while the 
NGOs cover the gaps and provide humanitarian work only” 
(NG1).
Participants described the interrelated and sometimes 
contested roles of relevant actors (ie, HDs, interim MoH, 
NGOs, UN agencies, donors, armed opposition groups) in 
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health system governance. However, discussion was relatively 
superficial. 
Participants highlighted that HDs’ governance role included 
monitoring other actors’ work, coordinating between 
actors, representing health professionals, monitoring health 
programmes, controlling medicines, identifying priorities, 
health education and granting qualifications, and preparing 
for post-conflict rebuilding in Syria. Thus, in future, HDs 
should be responsible to a national MoH, which could merge 
opposition-controlled and regime-controlled HDs. All 
NGO participants acknowledged HDs’ roles as local health 
authorities and NGOs’ partnership relationship, through 
financial support of HDs, joint programmes, cooperation, and 
involvement in decision-making. However, several indicated 
both varied depending how developed each HD was. 
“We coordinate directly and cooperate with HDs, but we 
do not financially support them because our donors refuse 
this […]. We depend on HD needs assessment. HD opinion 
on projects and priorities is very important… The existence 
of these HDs encourages NGOs to coordinate with each other 
through the HD” (NG3).
All donor participants described HDs as the local health 
authority, though some indicated this role was weak. It was 
unclear whether this unexpected response was because donor 
participants informally recognised HDs as local authorities, 
despite their organisations not providing HDs with the 
support to act as such, or due to participant bias (eg, assuming 
this was what they were supposed to say). 
Participants agreed that the interim MoH had no current 
role in health system governance, as it remained weak and its 
activities had been halted. There was no agreement on whether 
its role was symbolic or not, due to lack of political and 
financial support that prevented it fully supporting or being 
supported by HDs. Similarly, provincial and local councils’ 
did not have a direct role in health system governance, but 
were perceived as cooperating and coordinating with HDs, 
without an explicit executive role. However, some competed 
with HDs as did some NGOs and donors. 
Descriptions of donors were wide-ranging. Some described 
their governance role as supporting HD governance, eg, by 
providing salaries, running costs, training, capacity-building, 
and handing over projects to them. However, few donors 
supported HDs directly, instead working through NGOs due 
partially to concerns about treating opposition-controlled 
health authorities as political substitutes for the Syrian regime. 
Some donors indicated they should have a direct role in 
deciding a governance model or discussed political concerns 
about recognizing HDs as local authorities and consequently 
a substitute for the Syrian regime. Others indicated donors’ 
future role should be to provide higher-level support for HDs 
eg, training on building structures and developing policies 
or helping HDs to be self-funded. However, most non-donor 
participants did not describe donors as having a positive 
role in health system governance, either because donors did 
not recognise HDs as local health authorities or because 
donors were more interested in humanitarian response than 
development. One described donors’ role as negative, each 
supporting different governance models without coordinating 
between themselves. 
Descriptions of United Nations (UN) agencies’ governance 
role ranged from none to biased towards the Syrian regime. 
However, participants indicated that UN agencies could 
not formally recognise HDs as local health authorities in 
opposition-controlled areas, as to do so would mean their 
ejection from regime-controlled areas. However, UN agencies 
relied on HDs for some projects, eg, polio campaigns, giving 
HD managers the impression that the UN recognised them 
as the local health authorities in opposition-controlled areas.
Descriptions of NGOs indicated they had no or a negative 
role in health system governance, since they provided services 
regardless of governance. However, NGOs had an indirect 
role by supporting HDs, either technically (ie, training/
capacity-building) or financially, building partnerships to 
provide health services, or acknowledging HDs as local health 
authorities in programming. Views were mixed on whether 
this role would reduce post-conflict. Opinions ranged on the 
role of armed groups, though most suggested they did not 
interfere in health system governance. HDs engaged with 
them as necessary, while NGOs and donors insisted their 
organisations had no relationship with armed groups.
“We operate without seeking permission from military 
factions, because this country is for everyone!” (HD4)
Challenges to Health System Governance
Participants were asked about the main challenges to 
health system governance, with most describing these as 
security, funding, and HD capacity. Insecurity was related to 
governance in terms of weakening health system effectiveness, 
responsiveness, accountability, and intelligence. Security 
was identified as the major challenge for most participants 
and the source of other major challenges (eg, loss of health 
personnel with governance experience). Most discussed 
the regime’s systemic daily targeting of health facilities and 
personnel and risks of health-worker kidnappings by armed 
groups. For example, service-user participants discussed lack 
of safety in health facilities, due to deliberate targeting by the 
regime, which resulted in temporary or permanent closure 
of health facilities, reduced services and capacity, death and 
migration of health-workers, and destruction of equipment 
and medicines. One participant mentioned the absence of 
clinics in his area because of targeting. Another described a 
hospital being attacked with more than 150 barrel bombs and 
assassination of a hospital manager by Russian aircraft.
“They [Syrian regime] are even attacking primary 
healthcare centres, and even maternity care facilities. These 
are purely humanitarian facilities and do not treat war-
wounded people, and yet they are bombing them” (HD2).
Unpredictable funding was also related to governance 
in terms of weakening health system effectiveness, 
responsiveness, legitimacy, and strategic vision. Challenges 
were discussed by all except donors. Issues included the 
unstable funding support for HDs, major discrepancies 
between HD and NGO staff salaries, and lack of financial 
support for families of deceased health-workers. NGO 
participants noted it was easy to access funding for health 
projects, but very hard to access funding to support health 
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system governance (eg, through providing salaries, training, 
HD running costs), despite these costs being relatively low, 
eg, running costs of one hospital were equivalent to the 
whole provincial HD. Even when health system governance 
funding existed, it was usually for short periods, eg, 6 months. 
Additionally, as HDs in opposition-controlled areas were 
not politically recognised by UN agencies and many donors, 
receiving and managing funding was difficult.
Capacity was related to governance in terms of weakening 
health system effectiveness and responsiveness. Most 
participants discussed the loss of experienced governance 
professionals and frontline health-workers through death, 
disability, arrest, or migration that contributed to a lack of 
governance experience among HD staff. HD participants 
suggested that this was particularly acute because the prior 
health system was already weak, lacking effective regulation 
and distributional equity. As there was no one judicial, 
executive, or legislative authority, and clarity of HD structures 
were absent, HDs had to negotiate with all stakeholders, 
including multiple armed groups, which was difficult and 
time-consuming. 
The effects of reduced capacity on service consistency and 
quality were major concerns. For example, most HD staff had 
to work elsewhere to secure income and their limited time 
reduced the quality of their performance. Similarly, lack of 
supplies and services was interpreted as reducing quality. 
“Our children have been deprived of polio vaccination 
for 5 years. This year we were able to get it with the help of 
NGOs and UNICEF. We still do not have treatment centres 
for tumours and heart diseases in opposition-controlled 
areas. We are sending these cases to neighbouring countries” 
(HD2).
NGO and donor participants discussed HD weakness 
and health system fragmentation, including differences 
between HDs that prevented a unified system, shortages of 
qualified personnel, and limited overall capacity. While some 
attributed limited capacity to the targeting and migration 
of qualified personnel, one suggested that as Syria had been 
administered centrally, most qualified personnel were in 
Damascus, under regime control. Participants noted a lack 
of will to build health system governance, as Syria remained 
in the emergency response stage and actors – both local and 
international – were unwilling to work on health system 
governance building. Others indicated a lack of shared 
understanding of health system governance among different 
actors. Descriptions indicated a fragmented and challenging 
system that was not fully governed by HDs or other actors. 
For example, participants reported a sometimes complete 
dependence on NGOs, with each having its own potentially 
conflicting priorities, and HD competition with local and 
international bodies that were better established or stronger 
financially.
“The whole picture is only seen by HDs. NGOs cannot see 
the whole picture” (HD1).
All service-user participants discussed capacity 
as weakening governance by reducing effectiveness, 
responsiveness, and legitimacy (eg, through insufficient 
supplies and health-workers – especially doctors). It was 
difficult to find medicines, which even when available were 
not affordable, and chronic care suffered. One described 
visiting a doctor for consultation, who was seeing 3-4 patients 
at the same time and giving painkillers for non-emergency 
cases. Thus, capacity at health facilities was limited. 
“My hand was injured and fractured by shelling shrapnel […] 
I had to give first aid to myself…. When I went to the hospital 
they gave me painkillers, cooled down my situation, and sent 
me home […] there were hundreds of injured people…They 
were too busy with other injuries…” (SU4).
Potential Solutions
Participants suggested 3 main approaches to strengthening 
provincial health systems governance: (i) supporting HDs, (ii) 
mitigating health-worker losses, and (iii) coordination.
Supporting Health Directorates 
All participants agreed financial support was needed for HDs 
to provide meaningful governance in opposition-controlled 
areas. Existing largely ad-hoc funding mechanisms included 
collecting fees for services such as licensing or medicine 
testing, reintroducing symbolic user fees, developing income-
generating projects, finding staff part-time jobs (eg, with 
NGOs), volunteering their time with HDs where possible, 
and shifting funds from other programmes. For example, 
financing for deceased health-workers’ families involved 
diverting a percentage of staff salaries to a support fund. No 
methods were completely successful. HDs took advice from 
experts living outside Syria and depended on WHO and the 
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) regulations on strengthening health systems. 
NGO and donor participants discussed means of supporting 
HD governance, including financial support for staff salaries 
and running costs, technical support through training and 
capacity-building, and symbolic support by working with HDs 
as the recognised local health authorities. Symbolic support 
included increasing the visibility of HDs, using HD statistics, 
allowing HDs to monitor NGOs, representing HDs in the 
health cluster, involving HDs in decision-making, marketing 
HDs to donors, and handing over some tasks. Some NGOs 
had signed an agreement to support HDs and recognise them 
as the only local health authority in opposition-held areas. 
“In our exit plans, we always ensure that health projects 
should be handed over to HDs” (DO3).
Mitigating Health-Worker Losses
HD and donor participants identified mitigation of losses 
as crucial to governance, while NGO and service-user 
participants did not mention this. One participant described 
an 8-month health education initiative, to train new health-
workers to fill gaps. Called “training while working,” it was 
initiated to train and certify as ‘Nurse Assistants’ those working 
without qualifications in the health sector. It did not cover 
the medical gap (medical students need 6 years training and 
four years’ specialisation), but could encourage other health 
professionals to stay in the country since they could continue 
studying and progressing. Another participant addressed 
health-worker emigration and loss by increasing the workload 
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of existing doctors, with each working in several hospitals 
during the week. This increased burnout, worsening health 
system effectiveness and responsiveness. Another reported 
seeking advice from colleagues in other HDs to compensate 
for his own lack of leadership and governance experience. 
Donor participants discussed minimising expertise migration 
through financial incentives. Suggestions included providing 
employment or salaries where none existed, providing higher 
salaries for doctors in certain areas, and providing medical 
training to compensate for losses. 
Coordination
Participants suggested that coordination with other actors 
could help address health system fragmentation and 
competition in the absence of a united authority. NGO and 
donor participants stressed the importance of coordination 
among health actors, especially HDs, NGOs, and local 
councils. 
“We insist on coordinating with HDs in all matters even 
if we could solve issues more quickly through our partners 
without the HDs” (NG3).
Participants mentioned coordination through the 
humanitarian health cluster in Gaziantep Turkey, but 
highlighted that it gave HDs only one seat rather than a seat 
for each HD, which was described as insufficient given their 
differing needs and contexts. 
Discussion
Key Findings
This study adds to research on governance in opposition-
controlled areas in Syria and provides insights into health 
system governance experiences during conflict. Similar 
research on Syria focused on general governance or health 
needs, making this the first study authors are aware of 
examining health system governance in opposition-controlled 
areas and including a range of health system voices (ie, local 
health authorities, NGOs, donors, service-users). This may 
be the first study exploring Syrian service-user perspectives 
on health or governance since conflict began and is an initial 
attempt to explore health system governance during conflict, 
as previous research focused on ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction 
without considering efforts begun during conflict. 
All provider categories (ie, HDs, NGOs, donors) reported 
some level of strategic vision, accountability, transparency, 
and information management. Strategic vision focused on 
building local governance and continuing services provision. 
Short-term focus in strategic vision and planning is consistent 
with the High-Level Forum model and other literature on 
effects of chronic conflict on health system components.59,60 
Agreement among HDs and service-users that legitimacy 
was gained from local actors is consistent with governance 
research in Syria.35 Service-user agreement on health sector 
responsiveness and transparency, and varied opinions on 
effectiveness and participation, is consistent with Khalaf ’s 
argument that perceived effectiveness in Syria is based on 
service delivery.35 Thus, using Siddiqi and colleagues’ health 
system governance elements as qualitative measures appeared 
understandable to participants and was consistent with the 
literature.43,47,61-63
Emergence of grassroots governance was also observed 
during chronic conflicts, such as in Palestine and Somalia.31 
Importantly, HDs were most frequently identified as the 
bodies responsible for health system governance among all 
participants, with NGO and donor participants describing 
their role as supporting HDs in health system governance, 
which was not found in the literature. The interim MoH 
was described as having no meaningful role in health system 
governance, possibly due to its inability to support HDs 
financially, or reflecting the complex relationships with other 
actors. While observers often describe the emergence of HDs 
as a grassroots phenomenon, independent from interim MoH 
decisions, the reality is more complex. For example, though 
HDs were officially established by the interim MoH, they did 
not receive financial or technical support from it and therefore 
some HDs grew independently. Others existed before the 
interim MoH decree (eg, Idleb HD).
NGOs potentially negative role was consistent with the 
literature.64-68 For example, Haar argued that NGOs not 
coordinating project planning and implementation with local 
authorities negatively affected local authorities’ legitimacy 
and stability.66 Donor roles in supporting health system 
governance and coordination in fragile states has been 
highlighted,69 making it interesting that NGO and donor 
participants both suggested the other had no positive role in 
health system governance in Syria. Significant disagreement 
about UN agency roles was apparent, indicating tensions and 
contested perspectives within the international humanitarian 
community. Participant accusations of UN bias towards the 
Syrian regime was consistent with recent research.14 While the 
literature supported findings of interference by armed groups, 
most participants said armed opposition groups generally did 
not interfere in health system governance.13 
Health system governance challenges identified (ie, security, 
funding, capacity) were consistent with the literature, which 
also discussed targeting of health facilities and personnel, 
health-worker losses, lack of funding, and contestation between 
health system governance actors.13,34,66 Other “weaponisation 
of health” challenges include the Syrian regime halting health 
system financing in opposition-held areas and preventing 
humanitarian actors from working there.14 Differences in 
the perceived importance of challenges between participant 
categories are worth noting. For example, while security 
appeared crucial for HD and service-user participants, it was 
less discussed by NGO and donor participants. A potential 
reason was that HDs and service-users resided in Syria, 
while NGOs and donors were generally based outside the 
country. Funding seemed crucial for HD participants and 
less so for NGO and donor participants, perhaps because the 
latter had greater funding access. All mentioned capacity as 
a governance challenge, indicating its overall significance. 
Interestingly, HD participants highlighted lack of support, 
while NGOs highlighted lack of will to support HDs and 
build health system governance, and donors highlighted 
HD competence. These differences indicated a vicious circle 
in which HDs needed support to overcome weaknesses 
and build capacity, while donors were unwilling to support 
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HDs because they lacked capacity. Haar also suggested that 
donors perceive investment in fragile states as politically 
and financially risky, as such countries have relatively poor 
policies and institutions.66
The main solutions discussed by participants (ie, supporting 
HDs, mitigating health-worker losses, coordination) were 
consistent with existing literature.13,34,35,66,69,70 For example, 
Baker discussed establishing a nursing school in Aleppo.13 
Aljundi discussed the need for financial and technical 
support for local authorities in opposition-controlled areas.34 
Khalaf argued that economic and human resources were 
essential for governance success.35 It is worth noting that, 
though participants focused on how HDs could be supported, 
HDs were not merely passive recipients of interventions and 
could potentially do more themselves to engender support. 
However, it was also true that HDs had a very constrained 
policy space for manoeuvre. Thus, it is possible that provision 
of appropriate external support could potentially do more 
to improve their circumstances than changes within HDs 
themselves.
Since research was conducted, health system governance 
in Idleb and Hama remains relatively unchanged. Two of the 
study provinces (ie, Rural Damascus, Dara’a) were retaken 
by Russian and Syrian regime forces in 2018. All their local 
authority structures, including HDs, were dismantled for 
‘defying’ Syrian regime authority. In late 2016, Aleppo city 
and areas of surrounding countryside was retaken by Russian 
and Syrian forces, with similar treatment of HDs. In 2017-
2018, Turkey took control of northern Aleppo (ie, Euphrates 
Shield) and northwest Aleppo (ie, Kurdish-populated Afrin 
district), which had been controlled by Islamic State (IS) and 
by Kurdish YPG respectively. Health system governance in 
these 2 areas is now being led by the Turkish MoH.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Findings suggest several potential implications for policy-
makers (eg, recognising and supporting HDs’ health system 
governance role, considering long-term needs when allocating 
funding, advocating against health facility targeting), donors 
and practitioners (eg, supporting HD capacity-building 
and running costs, supporting health-worker education 
and training, improving coordination), and researchers 
(eg, identifying and examining health system governance 
initiatives in conflict-affected and opposition-controlled 
areas that can be built upon as violence reduces or ceases). 
Given the agreed importance of health system governance 
globally and the reality that it receives little funding or 
consideration in Syria, decision-makers could acknowledge 
and better support HD health system governance efforts. 
This would enable longer-term funding perspectives and 
greater strategic vision. However, to do this, the international 
community needs to accept HDs as the de facto health 
authority in opposition-controlled areas. 
Destruction of health facilities and personnel was considered 
a major challenge and a potential war crime. Humanitarian 
and security decision-makers globally must act more strongly 
to protect health facilities and personnel during conflict. 
Donors could strengthen existing health system governance 
by strengthening HDs, eg, building their capacity to be 
financially independent, and in the interim supporting HD 
salaries, running costs, and/or channelling health projects 
through them until they are strong enough to be independent. 
Ideally, some emergency response funding could support 
health system governance. Education initiatives need political, 
financial, and technical support to succeed. An example of 
a successful initiative that could be adapted is community 
midwifery education, eg, in Afghanistan.71,72 All practitioners, 
including HDs, should coordinate more deliberately at local 
levels, to overcome the challenges of fragmentation and 
multiple competing actors and interests to rebuild a unified 
health system. 
Further research is needed to examine health system 
governance elements, development, and initiatives in 
opposition-controlled areas and the perspective of a broader 
range of actors, particularly UN agencies. Research could 
compare other countries with ongoing conflict (eg, Somalia, 
South Sudan) to help generalise lessons learnt. Additionally, 
given the rapid changes in Syria, further qualitative research 
on the evolving situation will be needed. Study findings show 
that health system governance may begin while a conflict is 
ongoing, indicating that a broader research agenda on health 
governance emergence, development, effective elements and 
structures during conflict would be valuable. 
Limitations and Strengths 
This study had several limitations. First, health system 
governance is a complex concept for which data in Syria were 
extremely limited. Siddiqi and colleagues’ framework provided 
a useful starting point, but was insufficiently flexible for un-
adapted use in conflict-affected settings. Further work would 
be needed to adapt it for use in these settings. As participants 
were encouraged to provide their own interpretations of key 
terms, to facilitate relaxation and rapport, some limitations 
existed in translations as some had no precise equivalent in 
Arabic. For example, ‘accountability’ in Arabic gives a sense 
of investigation and lack of trust (the term was not used 
in pre-revolution Syria), while ‘legitimacy’ has religious 
connotations but can be understood as in English. Thus, 
though participants were familiar with governance concepts 
and terms, some responses were limited or superficial due 
to differential understanding or lack of in-depth knowledge. 
Similarly, excluding questions on some governance elements 
(eg, ethics) limited what data could be included in Table 1 on 
these concepts. 
Second, time and funding constraints prevented inputs 
from additional health system governance actors (eg, UN 
agencies, local/provincial councils, interim MoH, opposition 
armed groups) or exploration of inter-provincial differences 
between HDs. Similarly, detailing and distinguishing between 
the roles and capacities of local and international NGOs was 
beyond the scope of this research. 
Third, conducting interviews remotely could have 
influenced responses, eg, in terms of rapport, non-verbal 
cues, and additional ethics considerations of using third-
party software. However, similar to findings by Lo-Iacono 
et al, authors found that using WhatsApp or Skype and 
Douedari and Howard
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2019, 8(4), 233–244 243
additional ethics requirements did not appear to noticeably 
reduce participant candour or observed rapport.54 Finally, the 
situation in Syria is fluid, though results could still be relevant 
for areas of ongoing conflict and non-state control.
This study had several methodological strengths. First, 
the lead author was a Syrian health-worker who provided 
frontline healthcare in opposition-controlled areas during 
the current conflict and thus had solid insider knowledge 
of contextual and cultural issues. Second, HD participants 
and service-users were chosen from 5 opposition-controlled 
provinces to increase representation and explore issues in all 
opposition-controlled provinces. Third, major institutional 
actors in health system governance in opposition-controlled 
areas of Syria participated. Finally, inclusion of service-users 
in opposition-controlled areas was particularly important as 
service-user voices can be a particularly challenging to access 
during conflicts.
Final Thoughts
A purported reason for the Syrian uprising was as a popular 
revolution to create a more equitable country. Despite almost 
seven years of fighting, participants were clear that hope 
remains. Health system governance rebuilding has already 
progressed in opposition-controlled areas. Waiting until 
conflict ends to consider health system governance could 
irreparably weaken these fragile initiatives. Local HDs need 
specific political, technical, and financial support if they are 
to overcome ongoing challenges and develop sustainable 
governance.
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